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THE COLLISION BETWEEN COMMON ARTICLE
THREE AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
A. John Radsan'
My story has two important dates. On July 11, 2006, several days after
the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,1 Dana Priest
called me. Dana is a Washington Post reporter with a Pulitzer Prize for
the stories she has pried loose from the intelligence community. Her
past reports described a comprehensive covert action program since 9/11'
and a set of secret prisons, run by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
in Eastern Europe. That day, she asked me to comment on the CIA's
reaction to the Hamdan decision concerning military commissions in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. As many times before, she was ahead of the
day's news, more plugged into CIA headquarters than most CIA veter-
ans.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England had just announced that
all Defense Department activities would comply with Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions.5 That was one response to Hamdan, the
Supreme Court's ruling that President Bush's version of military commis-
sions did not comply with Common Article 3 or the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ). 6 The Bush administration seemed on the verge
+ Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law
(john.radsan@wmitchell.edu). Before joining the legal academy, the author worked for
several years as a federal prosecutor and as assistant general counsel at the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. He thanks Robert Delahunty and Richard Murphy for comments on this
Article and Thomas Berndt and Alethea Huyser for their research assistance.
1. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
2. See Dana Priest: 2006 Pulitzer Prize Winner in Category of Beat Reporting,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/inkset/2006/04/17/LI2006041700530.html
(last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
3. Dana Priest, Covert CIA Program Withstands New Furor, WASH. POST, Dec. 30,
2005, at Al.
4. Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2,
2005, at Al.
5. Memorandum from Gordon England, Deputy Sec'y of Def. (July 7, 2006) (on file
with Catholic University Law Review) (regarding the application of Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions to the treatment of detainees in the Defense Department).
6. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759; see Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§
801-946 (Supp. IV 2004). Common Article 3 was enacted as part of the 1949 Conventions.
See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
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of accepting a sweeping conclusion that Common Article 3 applied to
many other fronts in the conflict with al Qaeda, far beyond military
commissions.7
Dana Priest and other observers wanted to know whether an accep-
tance of Common Article 3 would be limited to the Defense Department,
or whether it would apply across the board to all United States agencies.
The White House press secretary, Tony Snow, caught up in the busy
preparations for the G-8 Summit in Moscow, had led some observers to
believe that the Bush administration, as a matter of new policy or as a
new interpretation of the law, had finally accepted the broadest applica-
tion of Common Article 3.8
Dana said that senior officials at the CIA were scrambling, concerned
about the impact that Common Article 3 would have on their activities.
The implications were huge. Not claiming to be an expert on interna-
tional humanitarian law, I asked Dana what Common Article 3 pre-
vented that the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) of 2005, 9 or the McCain
Amendment, did not already prevent. She paused. "You are the law-
yer," her silence seemed to say, "You tell me." As Dana moved on to
report on another story,"° I decided to come up with a better answer to
her question.
The second date to my story occurred less than two months after my
conversation with Dana Priest. On September 6, 2006, President Bush
in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of the Armed Forces art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. All references to Common Article 3
herein are cited to Geneva Convention III.
7. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795-96; News Release, Press Briefing by Tony Snow
(June 29, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060629-6.html [here-
inafter Press Briefing]. Justice Stevens' opinion disagreed with the D.C. Circuit "that the
war with al Qaeda evades the reach of the Geneva Conventions." Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at
2795 (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 41-42 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
8. Press Briefing, supra note 7 (stating that "we need to go ahead and bring to justice
those who are at Guantanamo in a manner consistent with law and with our obligations to
human rights"); see also Mark Mazzetti & Kate Zernike, White House Says Terror Detain-
ees Hold Basic Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 12,2006, at Al.
9. Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (to be codified in scattered sections of 10, 28,
and 42 U.S.C.). The Act prevented any person in United States custody from being sub-
jected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment as defined by the Fifth, Eighth, and Four-
teenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd (West Supp.
2007).
10. See Charles Babington & Michael Abramowitz, U.S. Shifts Policy on Geneva
Conventions, WASH. POST, July 12, 2006, at Al (noting Dana Priest's assistance in devel-
oping the article).
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acknowledged for the first time that the CIA had been running a pro-
gram of secret facilities for the detention and interrogation of high-level
terrorism suspects." Days before the five-year anniversary of 9/11, presi-
dential staffers had assembled a group of relatives of the victims of 9/11
to hear President Bush's dramatic speech from the East Room of the
White House." Although President Bush confirmed the broad lines of
the secret prison program, he did not specify how the interrogations were
conducted. 3 He explained: "I cannot describe the specific methods
used-I think you understand why-if I did, it would help the terrorists
learn how to resist questioning and to keep information from us that we
need to prevent new attacks on our country.'
14
President Bush also announced that fourteen suspected members of al
Qaeda were being transferred to the Defense Department facility in
Guantanamo. 5 Among them was Abu Zubaydah, one of America's early
catches after the war on terror was taken to al Qaeda's Afghan sanctu-
ary.16 Zubaydah, a coordinator of the Hamburg cell that included a num-
ber of the 9/11 hijackers, was captured in March 2002." Zubaydah's cap-
ture, President Bush detailed, led to the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mo-
hammed (KSM), the alleged mastermind of the 9/11 plot.'
In explaining the transfer of Zubaydah, KSM, and twelve other prison-
ers from secret facilities, President Bush noted the Supreme Court's
Hamdan decision: "[T]he Supreme Court's recent decision has impaired
our ability to prosecute terrorists through military commissions and has
put in question the future of the CIA program."'19 President Bush, how-
ever, made clear that he was keeping open the CIA's secret detention
and interrogation program.20 In the President's words, "having a CIA
program for questioning terrorists will continue to be crucial to getting
life-saving information."'"
11. Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1569,1570 (Sept.
6, 2006).
12. Id. at 1569.
13. Id. at 1570-71.
14. Id. at 1571.
15. Id. at 1573.
16. Id. at 1571; see also Michael R. Gordon, New Confidence US. Has a Qaeda
Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2002, at A13.
17. White House Was Flight 93 Target, CBS NEWS, May, 23, 2002, http://www.cbs
news.com/stories/2002/05/20/attack/main509535.shtml.
18. Remarks on the War on Terror, supra note 11, at 1571. Ron Suskind states that,
although the Zubaydah information was helpful to the CIA, KSM was captured as a result
of an informant who sought the twenty-five million dollar bounty that had been placed on
KSM's head. RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICA'S
PURSUIT OF ITS ENEMIES SINCE 9/11, at 204 (2006).
19. Remarks on the War on Terror, supra note 11, at 1574.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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As further explanation for the transfer of Zubaydah and company,
President Bush referred to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conven-
tions.2 Bush said that Common Article 3 created two basic problems for
the CIA's program of secret detention and interrogation.2 First, he
claimed that Common Article 3's terms were "vague and undefined.,
24
Second, he noted that those American officers involved in the detention
and interrogation of the suspects "could now be at risk of prosecution
under the War Crimes Act."' This was unusual bluntness, especially on
the second point, for an administration that has cloaked itself in secrecy.
Transferring the CIA's prisoners, by itself, did not eliminate any
vagueness to the Common Article 3 standards and did not immunize in-
telligence officers for their past conduct. However, at that moment in the
fall of 2006, President Bush was turning to Congress, behind a political
curtain, for the clarity and the immunity he claimed was necessary for the
CIA program. By throwing Zubaydah and KSM into the Guantanamo
mix, President Bush increased the chances that Congress would accede to
his demands on counterterrorism. Zubaydah and KSM, truly the worst of
the worst, were far more important to American law and politics than
Osama bin Laden's chauffeur.
As a delayed answer to Dana Priest, this Article attempts to answer
what really worried the CIA about Common Article 3. From the Sep-
tember 6, 2006 announcement to the present, many clues have come
straight from the President, the President's advisors, and congressional
leaders. Those clues, as detailed below, lead to a simple conclusion that
the CIA was worried that its officers would be exposed to civil and crimi-
nal liability for past actions and that aggressive tactics could no longer be
used for future interrogations of suspected terrorists.
Although the CIA reviewed this Article to make sure that I did not re-
veal anything classified, it has neither confirmed nor denied that my con-
clusion is accurate. Based on my experiences as a former CIA lawyer, I
offer a parallel path into what truly went on (and goes on) at the CIA.
The collision between Common Article 3 and the CIA that resulted
from the Hamdan decision is significant for historical and analytical rea-
sons. This collision relates more broadly to whether and how interna-
tional humanitarian law should be adjusted so that American intelligence
services, with justice and effectiveness, may counter the threat of interna-
tional terrorism. This collision is significant even though Congress and
the President, responding to Hamdan, passed the Military Commissions
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1574-75. Exposure to criminal and civil penalties is an obvious concern to
CIA officers. Although I left the CIA before the Hamdan decision, I heard more than one
officer ask, "What do we do when we get a Hillary Clinton Justice Department?"
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Act of 2006 (MCA).26 The MCA, precluding the widest application of
Common Article 3, is just one example of how American law has been
adjusted to the current realities of American counterterrorism."
The law can easily change. If any aspect of the MCA is deemed uncon-
stitutional, a broader application of Common Article 3 could spring back
into effect. In any case, the MCA should keep scholars and the courts
busy for years to come. Some question the breadth of the MCA's defini-
tion of enemy combatant 8 Some question the extent to which the pris-
oners have been stripped of access to the courts.29 And even if these con-
stitutional challenges do not succeed, Congress, in an unlikely scenario,
could choose to repeal the MCA-overriding what would likely be a veto
by President Bush-to restore Common Article 3's wide scope from the
Hamdan decision. Alternatively, with the MCA in place, the President
may choose to specify-through an Executive order or some other find-
ing-why military commissions must depart even further from Common
Article 3 or why Common Article 3 should not apply at all to interroga-
tions of suspected terrorists.3° That is, to reduce Common Article 3's ef-
fect even further than the MCA, the President may assert or seek addi-
tional powers. For example, if what is left of Common Article 3 under
American law impedes how aggressive the President would like to be in
26. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
27. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 10, 12, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 28, 31,
42,49, and 50 U.S.C.).
28. See, e.g., R. Jeffrey Smith, Detainee Measure to Have Fewer Restrictions, WASH.
POST, Sept. 26, 2006, at Al; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Q AND A: MILITARY COMMISSIONS
Acr OF 2006, at 5-6 (2006), http://hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/qnal006/usqnal006web.pdf;
Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com (Sept. 26, 2006,
02:58 EST). The MCA defines enemy combatant as "a person who has engaged in hostili-
ties or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States
or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part
of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces)." 10 U.S.C.A. § 948a(1) (West Supp. 2007).
29. See 152 CONG. REc. S10,354-69 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (debating and rejecting
Sen. Specter's amendment to strike the provision regarding habeas review). In Boumedi-
ene v. Bush, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the MCA, in limiting the detainees' access to do-
mestic courts through habeas petitions, does not violate the Suspension Clause of the Con-
stitution because "the Constitution does not confer rights on aliens without property or
presence within the United States." Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007). Boumediene also reaffirmed the holding in Johnson v.
Eisentrager that there is nothing in the Constitution or any statute that extends the right to
common law habeas to "'an alien enemy who, at no relevant time and in no stage of his
captivity, has been within [the United States'] territorial jurisdiction."' Id. at 990 (quoting
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950)). Even so, Boumediene is probably not
the last word on this topic.
30. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 note (Implementation of Treaty Obligations) (giving the
President authority to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions).
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interrogating the next round of high-level terrorists, he might attempt to
assert his commander in chief power to override the MCA or other perti-
nent aspects of American law. In short, Common Article 3 still matters
to American counterterrorism.
This Article, combining history with analysis, is divided into five parts.
In Part I, as prelude to the MCA, I summarize two references concerning
interrogations of suspected terrorists: the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 and Common Article 3.31 Second, I distill the Supreme Court's view
of Common Article 3 from the Hamdan decision.32 Third, I identify in-
terrogation tactics and activities that the CIA is reported to have used
since 9/11. 33 Fourth, I analyze how those tactics are affected, if at all, by
an application of Common Article 3.34 Fifth, I offer observations about
the retroactive wrinkle to the Hamdan decision and the potential that
CIA officers, without the MCA fix, could have been charged with war
crimes for their activities.35
I. LEGAL REFERENCES
Several steps are relevant. After World War II, in 1955, the United
States ratified the four Geneva Conventions, including Common Article
3. In 1990, the United States ratified the Convention against Torture.36
In 1996, the United States passed a federal statute against war crimes,
which were defined to include violations of Common Article 3.37
After a change in administration and after the attacks on 9/11, the
United States put itself on a war footing. Early in 2002, the Bush admini-
stration concluded that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to Amer-
ica's conflict with al Qaeda.38 So for years after 9/11, the CIA, relying on
legal advice from Justice Department and CIA lawyers, operated a secret
program of aggressive interrogation. 39 Then, at the end of 2005, the
McCain Amendment, resisted by the CIA, precluded the cruel, inhuman,
31. See infra Part I.
32. See infra Part II.
33. See infra Part III.
34. See infra Part IV.
35. See infra Part V.
36. See 136 CONG. REC. S17,486, S17,491-92 (1990); see also Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
37. War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-192, § 2, 110 Stat. 2104 (1996) (current
version at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West Supp. 2007)).
38. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Coun-
sel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J.
Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def. 1-2, 9-11 (Jan. 22, 2002) (on file with Catholic
University Law Review) [hereinafter January 2002 Memo].
39. See Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com (Dec.
16, 2005, 23:27 EST).
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and degrading treatment of prisoners.4° By the summer of 2006, Hamdan
overruled the Bush administration's 2002 conclusion that Common Arti-
cle 3 did not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda 1
From the beginning, the Bush administration has always said that it
does not use torture in its counterterrorism policies. The administration
reiterated this claim when an Office of Legal Counsel memorandum on
interrogation standards43 leaked to the public in 2004.44 This memoran-
41dum, substantially retracted in a December 30, 2004 memorandum, was
quite stingy in its definition of torture, equating torture with the pain
related to, among other things, "organ failure." 46
The Bush administration's stated policy against torture is consistent
with the Constitution and with state and federal statutes.47 Even so, for
several years after 9/11, a loophole may have allowed the CIA to conduct
interrogations that were severe but short of torture -according to the
administration's definition. This loophole depended on a distinction be-
tween "torture" and "cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment" (CID),
two related concepts from the Convention Against Torture.4 8 Even be-
fore torture was made a federal crime, under the Constitution and other
statutes, both torture and CID were illegal for interrogations within the
United States. 49 The federal statute, which was passed after the United
40. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd (West Supp. 2007).
41. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795-96 (2006).
42. See, e.g., News Release, Interview of the President by Laurence Oakes, Channel 9
TV (Oct. 14, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031018-4.html
(responding to inquires from Australian press by stating: "We don't torture people in
America. And people who make that claim just don't know anything about our country.").
43. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Coun-
sel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002),
in MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON
TERROR 115 (2002) [hereinafter August 2002 Memo].
44. Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture,
WASH. POST, June 8,2004, at Al.
45. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice (Dec. 30, 2004) (on file with Catholic University Law Review) [hereinafter
Levin Memo].
46. August 2002 Memo, supra note 43, at 119-20.
47. See Levin Memo, supra note 45; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, VIII, XIV; 18
U.S.C. § 2340A (2000); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West Supp. 2007); 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)
(codifying the Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991).
48. CAT, supra note 36, arts. 1, 16. The United States signed the Convention Against
Torture and provided its own interpretations of and reservations from its obligation. See
Office of the United Nations High Comm'r for Human Rights, Ratifications and Reserva-
tions: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/9.htm (last visited Apr. 1,
2007).
49. CAT, supra note 36.
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States ratified the Convention Against Torture, applies to torture outside
the United States, making it a crime if the offender is a United States
national, or is present in the United States." This statute does not men-
tion CID.51 Therefore, in interrogations that the CIA conducted on non-
U.S. citizens outside the United States, CID may have continued past the
December 2004 Office of Legal Counsel memorandum. 2 The CIA,
unlike the Defense Department, is not controlled by the strict standards
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.53 As a result, the CIA may have
operated in a gray zone below its definition of torture but beyond what
the criminal justice system permits in the questioning of suspects and de-
fendants. For a while, the CIA may have felt safe to use CID, but not
torture, on suspected terrorists who were afforded fewer rights than
American citizens.
By the time of the Hamdan decision in 2006, at least two sources of law
had the potential of restricting CIA practices in the intermediate zone of
aggressiveness: the McCain Amendment and Common Article 3. I ana-
lyze each of these sources in turn.
A. The McCain Amendment
The McCain Amendment, signed into law at the end of 2005 and then
made part of the Detainee Treatment Act, tried to close the CID loop-
hole.- The DTA prevents anyone in the custody or physical control of
the United States from being "subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment."55 Waterboarding, in which a prisoner is made
50. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A.
51. Id.
52. Levin Memo, supra note 45. In footnote 8, Levin states: "While we have identi-
fied various disagreements with the August 2002 Memorandum, we have reviewed this
Office's prior opinions addressing issues involving treatment of detainees and do not be-
lieve that any of their conclusions would be different under the standards set forth in this
memorandum." Id.
53. See 10 U.S.C. § 802 (2000).
54. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd (West Supp. 2007). This Article does not explore the possi-
bility that the President could override the McCain Amendment through his commander
in chief powers. President Bush's written statement upon signing the DTA, of course, left
open this possibility. Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Sup-
plemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic
Influenza Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1918, 1919 (Dec. 30, 2005) ("The
executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of the Act, relating to detainees, in a
manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the uni-
tary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional
limitations on the judicial power, which will assist in achieving the shared objective of the
Congress and the President ... of protecting the American people from further terrorist
attacks.").
55. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd(a).
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to feel that he is about to drown or suffocate, was said to stop. 6 The
definition of CID, however, was explicitly tied to American constitutional
standards. In step with the United States reservations to the Convention
Against Torture, the McCain Amendment took CID to mean the treat-
ment or punishment that the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibited 7 To the extent the American standard on CID differed from
international standards, the former controlled. 8
Tying CID's definition to an American standard related to an existing
debate on whether, or the extent to which, non-U.S. citizens who have
resided completely outside the United States have any due process or
other constitutional protections. 9 In this regard, the secret detainees,
being further away from American jurisdiction, may have a more tenuous
claim than the Guantanamo detainees to constitutional protection. In
fact, there has been some suggestion that the secret detainees do not have
any rights under due process or "shock the conscience" standards.60 In
any event, whether or not the detainees have protections beyond those of
the Constitution itself, the primary source of law for the DTA is Ameri-
can law.
As of July 11, 2006, the date of Dana Priest's inquiry, international law
could have factored into the judicial distillation of the standards for inter-
rogating suspected terrorists. That is, international law could have been a
56. See, e.g., Posting of Marty Lederman, supra note 39 (writing that the McCain
Amendment presumably prohibits waterboarding).
57. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd(d).
58. See id. § 2000dd(c).
59. See, e.g., David Luban, Op-Ed., Torture, American-Style, WASH. POST, Nov. 27,
2005, at B1.
One clue concerning due process rights comes from dicta in Rasul v. Bush. There, the
Supreme Court hinted that the claims of non-U.S. citizens at Guantanamo of excessive
detention without counsel or charge implicated the Due Process Clause. Rasul v. Bush,
542 U.S. 466, 483 n.15 (2004). That footnote has been fodder for varying views within the
legal academy on the due process rights of non-U.S. citizens. For the perspective that non-
citizens are not entitled to due process abroad, see J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Histori-
cal Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 469-70 (2007) ("[T]he Constitu-
tion does not protect the individual rights of noncitizens abroad whatsoever."). For a
contrary view, see Elizabeth Sepper, The Ties That Bind: How the Constitution Limits the
CIA's Actions in the War on Terror, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1805, 1811 ("[C]ertain fundamental
constitutional provisions limit the authority of an executive agency such as the CIA to act
against non-citizens abroad.").
60. See, e.g., To Continue to Receive Testimony on Military Commissions in Light of
the Supreme Court Decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Armed Services, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Neal Katyal, Professor of Law, George-
town University). The decision in Boumediene made clear that according to the D.C.
Circuit, at least, due process does not exist for non-citizens outside of the United States.
"The law of this circuit is that a 'foreign entity without property or presence in this country
has no constitutional rights, under the due process clause or otherwise."' Boumediene v.
Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 992 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007) (quoting People's
Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
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secondary source for American courts that interpreted the DTA, even as
it was tethered to American constitutional standards. In contexts other
than CIA interrogations, the Supreme Court has considered foreign law
to decide what constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" under the
Eighth Amendment." Plus, it has been part of the Supreme Court's
canon to interpret American statutes, to the extent reasonable, in line
with customary international law, including treaties and conventions.62
Even if the DTA's standards on interrogation are somewhat murky, the
statute's effective date, several years into the post-9/11 era, is clear.63 As
to interrogation standards, the McCain Amendment is not retroactive. 6
Indeed, once those who lobbied against the McCain Amendment realized
that the Senator had the votes for change, they insisted on legal protec-
tion for United States personnel who, upon the "[g]ood faith reliance on
advice of counsel," engaged in aggressive interrogations.65 In addition,
those who were on the CIA's side in Congress succeeded in giving the
government the option of paying the legal fees for any United States per-
sonnel who became the subject of a criminal or civil suit.66 Accordingly,
Congress moved in the direction of immunizing and reimbursing CIA
officers for their questionable work in the CID territory.
B. Common Article 3
Common Article 3, so named because it is present in all the Geneva
Conventions, tries to establish a minimum level of decency toward all
persons caught up in armed conflicts "not of an international character."
Prisoners of war, a special category under the Conventions, are entitled
to even more protections.6
61. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005) (considering international opinion
in determining whether juvenile death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment).
62. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); see also
JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 70, 99, 120,
124 n.2 (2d ed. 2003).
63. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(h), 119 Stat. 2739,
2743 (taking effect upon the date of enactment, December 30, 2005).
64. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd-l(a) (West Supp. 2007).
65. Id. Vice President Richard Cheney and then Director of Central Intelligence
Porter Goss tried to convince Senator McCain to withdraw his amendment. Eric Schmitt,
President Backs McCain on Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,2005, at Al.
66. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd-l(b) ("The United States Government may provide or
employ counsel, and pay counsel fees, court costs, bail, and other expenses incident to the
representation of an officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent de-
scribed in subsection (a) of this section, with respect to any civil action or criminal prosecu-
tion arising out of practices described in that subsection ... ").
67. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 3; see also 3 COMMENTARY ON THE
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 34-35
(Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter OFFICIAL COMMENTARY].
68. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 3.
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The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), accepted as
an authoritative interpreter of the Conventions, considers Common Arti-
cle 3 a "great step forward" in international law because the obligation of
decency applies "automatically," even if the other party to the conflict-
another state or a guerrilla group-is not a signatory to the Convention.69
The signatories to the Geneva Conventions place conditions on them-
selves regardless of the conduct of their adversaries. 70 Even if their ad-
versaries stoop to barbarism, and even if they are unlikely to be called to
account in the party's courts or before international tribunals, the signa-
tories will, in effect, fight with one hand tied behind their backs. That
one tied hand represents some decency and humanity.
Despite the noble motives behind the Geneva Conventions, the rule of
law has not graced all conflicts on our planet. For every letter of the al-
phabet, there seems to be a conflict that violates the Geneva Conven-
tions: Abkhazia, Bosnia, Chechnya, Darfur, and Eritrea, to name a few.
Those who trumpet international law might reply that the whole point is
to set high standards so that, even after some slippage, everyone and eve-
rything will not sink into the muck. Yet, the labels of "bandits" or "anar-
chists" or "brigands" for those who do not reciprocate Common Article
3, do not fully convey the horrors of the modern international terrorist.
71
A band of pirates in the eighteenth century might take a few ships hos-
tage. A band of terrorists in the twenty-first century can take entire na-
tions hostage.
One way to prevent a discussion of Common Article 3 from becoming
too abstract is to ask how al Qaeda would treat a captured CIA case offi-
cer. Members of al Qaeda, to be sure, are not gentle. Al Qaeda was be-
hind the ambush, torture, and execution of Daniel Pearl, a Wall Street
Journal reporter who covered events in Pakistan and Afghanistan.72 Al
Qaeda inspired the bombing of United Nations offices in Iraq.73 And,
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the former head of al Qaeda operations in Iraq,
had a nasty habit of beheading people who had come to Iraq to do good
deeds.74 Surely a CIA officer, a representative from the tip of the sword
in America's global struggle against terrorism, would be treated more
69. OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra note 67, at 35, 37 (stating that Common Article 3
is "applicable automatically, without any condition in regard to reciprocity").
70. See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 2.
71. See OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra note 67, at 36-38 (referring to civil distur-
bances as acts of "banditry," and to people that fail to apply Common Article 3 as anar-
chists and brigands).
72. See Fallen Journalist: Daniel Pearl Is Dead, Abducted in Pakistan and Killed by
Captors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2002, at Al.
73. See Dexter Filkins & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Scene of Carnage: Bomb in Cement
Truck-Dozens Hurt and Many Are Missing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2003, at Al.
74. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi Lived a Brief, Shadowy Life Re-
plete With Contradictions, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,2006, at A10.
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harshly than journalists, international civil servants, and relief workers.
The CIA officer, besides being a prominent symbol, might have useful
information about CIA operations against al Qaeda. The CIA officer,
pried loose of this information, could lead al Qaeda to other CIA offi-
cers. Would Zarqawi or someone of his ilk pause to consider interna-
tional humanitarian law in treating the captured CIA officer? Would
Zarqawi consult lawyers on the finer points of Common Article 3? If, by
a miracle, Zarqawi had had the least interest in international law, he
could have argued that because the CIA officer was not wearing a mili-
tary uniform, he was not entitled to prisoner of war status.
To paraphrase former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the battle be-
tween the United States and international terrorism is not a conflict of
76
civilizations. It is a conflict for civilization. In this conflict, our respect
for the law maintains support from our public and from our allies. Even
so, respect for the rule of law is a necessary but insufficient tool against
the terrorists. Success requires other tools such as diplomacy, security
measures, military operations, intelligence, and covert action.
In reality, the Geneva Conventions have had only a modest effect in
preventing barbarism in places like Sarajevo, Kampuchea, and Rwanda.7
In the treaty books, articles other than Common Article 3 regulate inter-
state warfare, while Common Article 3 draws in intrastate warfare.8 As
to Common Article 3, the ICRC assumes that the armed conflicts are for
control of, or secession from, a government. 79 For the ICRC, those who
do not comply with Common Article 3-rebels-merit the opprobrious
labels of bandit, anarchist, or brigand.8 The fact that the ICRC does not
75. Common Article 3, of course, is a separate question from whether POW protec-
tions apply during the conflict between the United States and al Qaeda.
76. Janet Stobart, Blair Defends Foreign Policy of Intervention, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22,
2006, at A3 (quoting Prime Minister Blair as stating that the war on terror is not "'a clash
between civilizations. It is a clash about civilization. It is the age-old battle between pro-
gress and reaction, between those who embrace and see opportunity in the modern world
and those who reject its existence."').
77. See Calling for Forgiveness, Serbia Leader Apologizes to Bosnia for War, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2003, at A3 ("[M]ore than 10,000 people died during [the] siege by Ser-
bian forces that lasted for three and a half years .... ); Elizabeth Becker, Lon Nol Pleads
for Cambodia Help, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1978, at A22 ("Since the communist govern-
ment of Democratic Kampuchea was established, an estimated 1 million people have been
executed or have died of starvation ...."); James C. McKinley Jr., Rewriting Burundi's
Brutal Past, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1997, at A8 (explaining that the Huti-led genocide of the
Tutsi in Rwanda ended in the death of more than 500,000 people).
78. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 3 (applying to conflicts "not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties").
79. See OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra note 67, at 36 (noting that Common Article 3
applies to civil disturbances).
80. See id. at 37-38 ("If an insurgent party ... does not apply [Common Article 3] it
will prove that those who regard its actions as mere acts of anarchy or brigandage are
right.").
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recognize that anarchy or disorder could become complete, without any
government in charge, suggests, in part, that the Conventions are not
adjusted to the modern era.81 The Conventions do not anticipate failed
states whereby areas of the globe are controlled by thugs and warlords.
Common Article 3, however, does provide some specificity in what is
prohibited. Most relevant to CIA practices are the various subsections
within the first section on the treatment of all persons.82 First, "violence
to life and person .... mutilation, cruel treatment and torture" are pro-
hibited." Second, the "taking of hostages" is banned.84 Third, "outrages
upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treat-
ment" are also banned.85 Fourth, judicial proceedings related to the per-
sons must provide all "guarantees which are recognized as indispensable
by civilized peoples."8
These provisions, as the ICRC concludes, boil down to an obligation of
"humane treatment."87 Such treatment is laudable, but the generality of
this phrase makes it difficult for legal counsel to provide specific advice to
policymakers-at the CIA and elsewhere-who choose to approach the
line of legality without crossing into illegality. Perhaps the generality of
the Geneva Conventions is intended to preclude such line-drawing.
When the lines between conventional and unconventional warfare are
blurred, perhaps a focus on one Article of the Geneva Conventions pro-
vides a more concrete service than a broad statement about the paradox
of regulating warfare. Common Article 3, for an international text, is
relatively short. To some extent, Common Article 3 overlaps with the
DTA in precluding "cruel" and "degrading" treatment. 8 But, because
Common Article 3 precludes more than the DTA does, 89 it has an in-
creased potential for adjusting the practices of American counterterror-
ism. Torture, certainly, is off limits under both Common Article 3 and
81. See Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Statehood and the Third Geneva Conven-
tion, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 131, 163 (2005) (concluding that because the President could have
considered Afghanistan a failed state at the initiation of the Afghan campaign, "the Presi-
dent could have concluded that the Third Geneva Convention was no longer in effect as
between the United States and Afghanistan").
82. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 3(1)(a)-(d) (providing specific pro-
hibitions that are offered in contradistinction to "humane" treatment).
83. Id. art. 3(1)(a).
84. Id. art. 3(1)(b).
85. Id. art. 3(1)(c).
86. Id. art. 3(1)(d).
87. See OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra note 67, at 39 (stating that the Conventions
chose not to undertake the difficult task of defining "humane treatment," but instead
chose to enumerate things that are incompatible with it).
88. Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd (West Supp. 2007), with Geneva Convention III,
supra note 6, art. 3.
89. Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd, with Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 3.
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the DTA. 90 Yet, Common Article 3 may cover more of the CID territory
than the DTA does because the Geneva Conventions, unlike the DTA,
are not tied to American constitutional standards. 9' Further, Common
Article 3, as part of the Geneva Conventions, may go beyond the concept
of CID, which stems from the Torture Convention. 9' For example, push-
ing a prisoner may not qualify as either torture or CID under the Torture
Convention but might qualify as a violation of Common Article 3 as an
"outrage[] upon personal dignity."93
Early into the global struggle against terror, the Bush administration
recognized the potential importance of Common Article 3. The Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC), in its memorandum concerning the application of
international treaties and federal laws to al Qaeda and Taliban detainees,
concluded in January 2002 that the United States was not required to
treat al Qaeda members consistent with Common Article 3.9 In doing so,
OLC rejected the Prosecutor v. Tadic decision from the International
Criminal Tribunal (ICT) for the Former Yugoslavia. 9 OLC criticized the
ICT "view that common article 3 applie[d] to all armed conflicts of any
description other than those between state parties.96 OLC suggested that
the better view limited Common Article 3 "to internal conflicts between
a State and an insurgent group."' Alberto Gonzales, as White House
counsel, supported OLC's conclusions and conveyed them to President
Bush.98 As a result, in February 2002, President Bush announced that,
although terrorism "detainees [would] be treated humanely," neither
Common Article 3 nor any other part of the Geneva Conventions would
apply except to the extent "appropriate and consistent with military ne-
cessity. '99 Although the CIA Director was included in the list of officials
who received the President's memorandum, its operative language was
directed, not to the CIA, but to the United States Armed Forces.i°°
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan, Common Article 3
did not seem to interfere with the actions of the Defense Department, the
CIA, and other American agencies in countering terrorism. In addition,
90. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd; Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 3(1)(a).
91. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd; Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 3.
92. Compare CAT, supra note 36, art. 1(1), with Geneva Convention III, supra note 6,
art. 3.
93. Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 3(1)(c).
94. January 2002 Memo, supra note 38, at 1.
95. See id. at 8-9.
96. Id. at 8.
97. Id.
98. See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to George
W. Bush, U.S. President (Jan. 25,2002), in DANNER, supra note 43, at 83.
99. See Memorandum from George W. Bush, U.S. President (Feb. 7, 2002), in
DANNER, supra note 43, at 83.
100. See id. at 106.
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as the public's attention was diverted to the abuses (and the perception of
abuses) at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib,' ° ' both of which are Defense
Department facilities, the CIA avoided some scrutiny of its own prac-
tices.
An important day of reckoning for all agencies involved in counterter-
rorism came more than four years after 9/11 when the Supreme Court
heard Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.'02 As far as Common Article 3 was con-
cerned, the Bush administration hoped that the Supreme Court would
accept the OLC's logic in the same way as the Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit. ' °3 The new Chief Justice, John Roberts, who was part of the
D.C. Circuit's decision, recused himself from the case in the Supreme
Court.'°4 So, to start, one vote was lost for the Bush administration.
II. HAMDAN ON COMMON ARTICLE 3
Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni national, had been captured in Af-
ghanistan during American operations after the 9/11 attacks.'5 Eventu-
ally, he was transferred to Guantanamo and designated an enemy com-
batant.' This designation, in accordance with the Court's decision in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,0 7 was confirmed through a Combatant Status Re-
view Tribunal (CSRT). '08
For some reason, the Bush administration chose not to let Hamdan
languish in limbo. Perhaps the administration wanted to show the public,
at home and abroad, that it could convict some al Qaeda members, even
if those convictions did not occur within the criminal justice system."' 9
Unlike the case of David Hicks, in which the Australian government
101. See, e.g., Josh White, Abu Ghraib Dog Tactics Came From Guantanamo, WASH.
POST, July 27, 2005, at A14 (describing similarities in prisoner mistreatment at the two
facilities).
102. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
103. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 40-42 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (dismissing Ham-
dan's Geneva Convention challenge on three independent grounds: (1) the Geneva Con-
ventions were not judicially enforceable; (2) Hamdan was not entitled to their protections;
and (3) even if he was entitled to their protections, the abstention rule set forth in
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), was appropriate), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2749
(2006).
104. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2749.
105. Id. at 2759.
106. Id. at 2759, 2761.
107. 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (plurality opinion) (holding that "a citizen-detainee seek-
ing to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual
basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual asser-
tions before a neutral decisionmaker").
108. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761.
109. Zacarias Moussaoui's conviction in the Eastern District of Virginia is one example
where an al Qaeda member was convicted in the criminal justice system. See Jerry
Markon, Moussaoui Pleads Guilty in Terror Plot, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2005, at Al.
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pushed for this Australian prisoner in Guantanamo to receive justice,1
there is little evidence that the Yemeni government pushed for Hamdan's
trial.
Under the presumed authority of President Bush's order of November
13, 2001, which established the military commissions,"' Hamdan was
charged with violating the laws of war."2 Hamdan was suspected of being
Osama bin Laden's driver and bodyguard, and of transporting weapons
and personnel on behalf of al Qaeda.113
Hamdan challenged the legality of the military commission that had
been created to try him, not his designation as an enemy combatant."'
The military commission that was to try Hamdan did not provide him
with as many protections as courts-martial under the UCMJ."5 The rules
of evidence were less stringent."' The commission permitted "any evi-
dence that, in the opinion of the presiding officer, would have probative
value to a reasonable person.""' 7  Arguably, this loose standard was
needed to protect the CIA's sources and methods and to slip in evidence
that was obtained through coercion. In addition, Hamdan could be-and
was-excluded from portions of the trial.118 Hamdan argued that, be-
cause Congress had not authorized the military commission, these depar-
tures from usual procedures violated the UCMJ and Common Article
3.119
Justice Stevens, writing for himself and three other members of the
Court, as well as Justice Kennedy, who concurred in most of the judg-
ment, agreed with Hamdan.'20 Justice Stevens rejected the government's
argument that Congress had authorized the military commissions through
the Authorization for Use of Military Force, passed soon after 9/11, or
through the Detainee Treatment Act, passed years later.2 Justice Ste-
110. Neil A. Lewis, Australian Pleads Not Guilty to Terrorism Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2004, at A14.
111. See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16,2001).
112. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2760-61.
113. Id. at 2761.
114. Id. at 2759 (noting that Hamdan's "objection is that the military commission the
President has convened lacks authority" to try him).
115. Id. at 2786.
116. 1l at 2786-87.
117. Id. at 2786.
118. Id. at 2786, 2788.
119. Id. at 2787, 2793.
120. Id. at 2798. Since Justice Kennedy viewed the military commissions as a violation
of the UCMJ, passed by Congress, he disagreed with Justice Stevens that it was necessary
to discuss the specifics of whether the military commissions complied with Common Arti-
cle 3's notion of a "regularly constituted court" or whether the conspiracy charge against
Hamdan comported with Common Article 3. Id. at 2809 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 2774-75 (majority opinion).
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vens, in broad brushes, stated that the President had not adequately
demonstrated why the procedures for the military commissions needed to
deviate from the UCMJ.22
As to military commissions, Hamdan was allowed judicial enforcement
of international law, including the Geneva Conventions 23 Under the
UCMJ, if the United States charges a violation of the laws of war, it must
follow international law in its procedures for the military commissions.'24
In other words, Justice Stevens gave Hamdan and other suspected terror-
ists a sort of shield-but not a sword. When the administration did not
receive Congress' blessing on the commissions, Justice Stevens said the
Geneva Conventions were incorporated into the procedures used to
prosecute violations of the laws of war.'2' Otherwise, Justice Stevens did
not go any further in allowing suspected terrorists to have judicial en-
forcement of the Geneva Conventions.
In Hamdan, Justice Stevens did not address whether al Qaeda detain-
ees are entitled to protections beyond Common Article 3.126 The major-
ity's conclusion that Common Article 3 applied to Hamdan was deemed
enough to support a ruling that Hamdan's military commission did not
comply with American law. 7  The Court rejected the government's ar-
gument that Common Article 3 did not apply to the conflict with al
Qaeda.1'
In effect, by applying Common Article 3 to all conflicts that were not
between states, Justice Stevens rejected OLC's argument that Common
Article 3 was essentially limited to civil wars. Further, Justice Stevens
said it was irrelevant under Common Article 3 that al Qaeda was not a
signatory to the Geneva Conventions.9 He suggested that Common
Article 3 is the baseline for everyone, regular or irregular combatant,
caught up in the conflict between the United States and al Qaeda"3°
122. Id. at 2797-98 (plurality opinion) (requiring some showing of "evident practical
need" to justify deviations from UCMJ).
123. Id. at 2796 (majority opinion).
124. Id. at 2786.
125. Id. at 2795-97.
126. See id. at 2795-96, 2798.
127. Id. at 2794-95 ("[R]egardless of the nature of the rights conferred on Hamdan,
[the Geneva Conventions] are ... part of the law of war. And compliance with the law of
war is the condition upon which the authority set forth in Article 21 is granted." (citations
omitted)).
128. Id. at 2795.
129. See id. at 2796 ("Common Article 3 ... affords some minimal protection ... to
individuals associated with neither a signatory nor even a nonsignatory 'Power' who are
involved in a conflict 'in the territory of' a signatory.").
130. See id. (stating that the scope of Common Article 3 must be interpreted as broadly
as possible).
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It is not clear whether the Court's view is limited to Hamdan's military
commission because it was not a "'regularly constituted court,"' the
strict holding of the case,' or whether the Court's view extends toward
many other practices in the conflict with al Qaeda. The disdainful tone
toward the executive, including references to executive "whim,"'32 and
the summary dismissal of the government's arguments about inherent
presidential powers,133 open up the expansive view of the decision. Even
so, as Justice Stevens made explicit, the Hamdan decision did not over-
rule the executive's prerogative to hold Hamdan for the duration of the
conflict as an enemy combatant 34 Absent congressional authorization,
Hamdan simply could not be tried by procedures that fell short of the
court-martial system.
13
1
Justice Stevens gave Common Article 3 the broad interpretation that
OLC had earlier rejected as an amendment of the Geneva Conventions
without the consent of the signatories. 36 Perhaps Common Article 3,
under the broadest reading of Hamdan, was in effect before 9/11, on 9/11,
and after 9/11 for all al Qaeda detainees, not just those in Guantanamo.
If Common Article 3 has thus applied to all fronts in the United States
conflict with al Qaeda, the perceived loophole for some CIA interroga-
tions between torture and what is permitted in the criminal justice system
may have been an illusion. The DTA, Senator McCain's valiant effort,
may thus be described as superfluous, as a softer reminder of Common
Article 3's prohibitions, or as extra insurance for humane practices in
American counterterrorism.
The Defense Department's loss on its version of military commissions
in Hamdan may have caused a broader setback for all American agencies
engaged in counterterrorism. Once upon a time, the CIA could hide its
problems behind the Defense Department's problems, or the CIA could
hide secret detainees behind the prisoners in Bagram, Guantanamo, and
Abu Ghraib. After Hamdan, in the scrambling that Dana Priest de-
tected, the Defense Department's setback became the CIA's setback.
131. Id. at 2796-97 (quoting Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 3(l)(d)).
132. Id. at 2797 n.65.
133. See id. at 2791-93.
134. Id. at 2798 ("It bears emphasizing that Hamdan does not challenge, and we do not
today address, the Government's power to detain him for the duration of active hostilities
in order to prevent such harm.").
135. Id. at 2791-93, 2798.
136. Id. at 2795 (defining "'conflict not of an international character"' as any armed
conflict that is not between two nations (quoting Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art.
3)).
137. See Dana Priest & Scott Higham, At Guantanamo, a Prison Within a Prison,
WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2004, at Al (identifying secret CIA prisons within Guantanamo
Bay, "on an off-limits corner of the Bagram air base in Afghanistan, on ships at sea and on
Britain's Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean"); see also Dana Priest & Joe Stephens,
[Vol. 56:959
2007] Common Article Three and the Central Intelligence Agency 977
Those who applaud the Hamdan decision, of course, will reject nega-
tive descriptions of that case as a "loss" or a "setback." For them, Ham-
dan, a landmark decision, was a giant step forward in applying the rule of
law. As they would describe, all that changed was that American agen-
cies were reminded that they must treat prisoners humanely."' In neutral
terms, whether Hamdan is a loss or a gain, it now seems clear that the
Supreme Court caused the CIA to reassess its practices significantly.
III. CIA PRACTICES
For my purposes here, I assume that to the extent any non-U.S. citizens
have been (or are) in CIA custody, they are connected to al Qaeda and
were captured outside their countries of residence.3 9 That assumption
corresponds with the public record about the CIA detainees, and com-
ports with Hamdan's focus on al Qaeda rather than the Taliban.' 4° Ac-
cording to Hamdan, even if full Geneva protections do not apply to the
"conflict with al Qaeda," Common Article 3, at a minimum, does apply.14 1
The CIA has taken custody of terrorism suspects through various
means. Some suspects were captured by the Defense Department or
other United States agencies and then transferred to the CIA. 42 Some,
especially in the early days of the American ground offensive in Afghani-
stan, had been turned over to the United States by Afghan warlords and
other bounty hunters.143 And some suspects were captured by the intelli-
gence services and military wings of foreign governments.
A joint American-Pakistani operation is said to have resulted in Abu
Zubaydah's capture in March 2002.'44 Zubaydah, described as an al
Qaeda lieutenant, seems to have been the first significant capture.'4 s Ac-
cording to the press, the FBI and the CIA had an impassioned debate
Secret World of US. Interrogation, WASH. POST, May 11, 2004, at Al (identifying secret
CIA prison at Abu Ghraib, whose prisoners were referred to as "ghost detainees").
138. See Linda Greenhouse, Military Panels Found to Lack Authority-New Law Pos-
sible, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,2006, at Al.
139. Otherwise, the Geneva Conventions restrict occupying powers in ways that go
beyond Common Article 3. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 2. The Ameri-
can presence in Iraq is a case in point.
140. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795.
141. Id.
142. See Jane Mayer, A Deadly Interrogation, NEW YORKER, Nov. 14, 2005, at 44 (dis-
cussing the CIA's interrogation of Department of Defense capture Manadel al-Jamadi).
143. See Joel Brinkley & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Releases Saudi-American It Had Cap-
tured in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at A15 (discussing capture of Yaser
Hamdi); Raymond Bronner, Australia Uneasy About US. Detainee Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
10, 2005, § 1, at 10; Neil A. Lewis, US. in Talks to Return Scores Held At Cuba Site, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2003, at A7 (discussing the capture of detainees by bounty hunters).
144. SUSKIND, supra note 18, at 88-89.
145. See David Johnston, At a Secret Interrogation, Dispute Flared Over Tactics, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, § 1, at 1.
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about how Zubaydah, a terrorist facilitator and a logistics person, should
be interrogated.' 6 The FBI, based on a criminal justice model with a goal
of preserving the possibility that the suspect's statements could eventu-
ally be used in court, advocated establishing rapport with the suspect.
147
The CIA, probably convinced that Zubaydah had been trained in coun-
terinterrogation tactics, advocated harsher tactics.'48 The CIA seems to
have won that debate, closer to 9/11, when the risks seemed higher than
today that there would be follow-on attacks from al Qaeda.
During Zubaydah's interrogation, pain medication may have been
withheld from him, and other harsh tactics may have been used, including
depriving him of sleep, bombarding him with loud music, forcing him to
remain in "stress positions," dousing him with cold water, and keeping
the temperature to his cell uncomfortably hot or cold.149  Thus, the
Zubaydah interrogation went far beyond what would be permitted within
the criminal justice system. The Bush administration, having read Com-
mon Article 3 out of this context, seemed to have operated on the as-
sumption that these techniques did not violate Zubaydah's due process
rights, if he had any. Zubaydah, the record shows, is a non-U.S. citizen
and the interrogations were conducted outside the United States.""
A year later, another joint American-Pakistani operation resulted in
KSM's capture.' KSM, called the mastermind of the 9/11 plot, was a
bigger capture.' KSM is reported to have been waterboarded, a practice
that involves either strapping wet towels over the suspect's face or dunk-
ing him under water while attached to a board.' Under either variation,
the objective is to frighten the suspect into thinking that he is about to
drown or suffocate.5 4 Thus, KSM's interrogation also went far beyond
the criminal justice system.
Besides Zubaydah and KSM, the CIA captured some suspects on its
own. Of these, some were snatched from less than traditional battle-
fields. For example, the CIA is alleged to have snatched Abu Omar, a
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. Id.; SUSKIND, supra note 18, at 115.
150. See Johnston, supra note 145 (reporting that the interrogations took place in Thai-
land).
151. See Jonathan F. Lenzner, Note, From a Pakistani Stationhouse to the Federal
Courthouse: A Confession's Uncertain Journey in the U.S.-Led War on Terror, 12 CAR-
DOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 297, 297 & n.2 (2004).
152. Remarks on the War on Terror, supra note 11, at 1571-72.
153. Dan Eggen, Cheney's Remarks Fuel Torture Debate, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2006,
at A9.
154. Id.
[Vol. 56:959
2007] Common Article Three and the Central Intelligence Agency 979
radical Muslim cleric, from the streets of Milan on February 17, 2003.55
Other suspects were taken from traditional battlefields such as Afghani-
stan. Finally, the CIA is said to have kept "ghost detainees" at Abu
Ghraib -prisoners whom the CIA convinced the Defense Department
not to place on official rolls.
5 7
Although President Bush claimed on September 6, 2006 that all prison-
ers from CIA facilities were being transferred to Guantanamo, he re-
tained the option of putting future captures into the secret program.
While he answered some questions about the program, he left many as-
pects a mystery. He confirmed that "alternative" techniques had been
used but refused to provide any specifics.159  By the President's claim,
such specifics would provide dangerous tips to al Qaeda for training its
operatives in counterinterrogation.' 60 Moreover, the administration has
not confirmed where the CIA facilities were or are located, when the
program began, or how many suspects have been in the program.161
For political and legal reasons, the CIA's secret prisons must be outside
the United States. Although a few CIA prisoners may have been mixed
into known Defense Department facilities at Bagram Air Force Base in
Afghanistan, Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, or Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,'62
the bulk of CIA prisoners must have been held somewhere else because
holding them at known locations would contradict the CIA's asserted
need for secrecy. Thailand, Poland, and Romania have been mentioned
as sites. Estimates from outside the administration put the total for the
program at about one hundred different persons over several years, with
thirty to forty persons usually held at any time.'6 Moreover, one journal-
ist speculated to me, in private, that after Dana Priest broke her story
about secret CIA prisons in Eastern Europe, the CIA rounded up the
155. A. John Radsan, A More Regular Process for Irregular Rendition, 37 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2006); Craig Whitlock, Europeans Investigate CIA Role in Abductions,
WASH. POST, Mar. 13,2005, at Al.
156. SUSKIND, supra note 18, at 55 (describing then CIA Director George Tenet's
concerns with holding CIA captures in Afghanistan).
157. Josh White, Army, CIA Agreed on 'Ghost' Prisoners, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2005,
at A16.
158. Remarks on the War on Terror, supra note 11, at 1573-74.
159. Id. at 1570-71.
160. Id. at 1570.
161. Id.
162. Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations,
WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at Al; Priest & Higham, supra note 137; White, supra note
157.
163. Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, Sources Tell ABC News Top Al Qaeda Figures
Held in Secret CIA Prisons, ABC NEWS, Dec. 5, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/
Investigation/story?id=1375123.
164. See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspect in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2,
2005, at Al.
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prisoners and transferred them all to Mauritania. By this theory, KSM
and company, without much of a change in external temperature, were
eventually transferred from Mauritania to Cuba.
Keeping track of secret prisoners is a difficult task for scholars, human
rights organizations, and other outside observers. Sometimes terrorism
suspects were jointly controlled by the United States and foreign jurisdic-
tions. Sometimes they were transferred into United States custody from
foreign jurisdictions. Sometimes they were transferred between United
States agencies. Sometimes they were jointly controlled by more than
one United States agency. Sometimes they were transferred to foreign
jurisdictions. Over and over, a prisoner could have been recycled from
one set of hands to another. The transfer to foreign jurisdictions, usually
described as "extraordinary rendition," has been roundly criticized, along
with many other Bush administration policies, since the public perception
is that rendition facilitates coercive interrogations that would not be pos-
sible (or legal) in United States territory or under United States con-
trol. 65
As noted, secret prisoners, under the designation of "enemy combat-
ants," may be held for the duration of the American conflict with interna-
tional terrorism-perhaps indefinitely.' 66 Nothing in the Hamdan deci-
sion challenges that possibility. However, before the transfer to Guan-
tanamo, there is no indication that KSM and company were given any-
thing close to the process that the Supreme Court in Hamdi determined
was necessary for a United States citizen, that is, "a fair opportunity to
rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decision-
maker. 167 While the CIA has made errors in identifying terrorists from
other countries, confusing a good Khaled El-Masri with a bad one in a
rendition from Macedonia, '68 the CIA apparently did not provide much
process to confirm that the secret CIA prisoners were actually the bad
guys they were suspected to be. The CIA expects us to take these things
on trust.
So far, despite President Bush's claim that the terrorists will be brought
to justice, none of the secret prisoners has been tried by a military com-
mission. In many respects, they are still outside the rule of law. After
being transferred to Guantanamo, KSM has gone through the CSRT.
69
165. Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106, 106
("Critics contend that the unstated purpose of such renditions is to subject the suspects to
aggressive methods of persuasion that are illegal in America-including torture.").
166. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2798 (2006).
167. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (plurality opinion).
168. David Johnston, Rice Ordered Release of German Sent to Afghan Prison in Error,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2005, at A3.
169. See Josh White, Alleged Architect of 9/11 Confesses to Many Attacks, WASH. POST,
Mar. 15, 2007, at Al.
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The CSRT, which confirms his enemy combatant status, is not a trial,
however. Before his transfer, his home government was apparently not
pushing for transparent justice for him. Although the other Guantanamo
detainees have had advocates, fewer people spoke up on behalf of KSM
when he was in CIA custody.1 70 By contrast, David Hicks, one of the
original Guantanamo detainees slated for trial by military commission
along with Hamdan, has had the Australian government and others look-
ing out for him.171
The secret prisoners, while in the CIA program, were sealed off from
the world. They were not provided the benefits that go along with pris-
oner of war status, and only after they were transferred to Guantanamo,
was the International Committee of the Red Cross allowed to visit
them.7  In the secret program, their only interactions appear to have
been with interrogators. They did not have access to lawyers, family, or
friends.
IV. A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS
Based on the public record about CIA activities, one might narrow the
questions concerning the CIA's collision with Common Article 3. First,
may the prisoner be held in a secret facility? Second, may the prisoner be
prevented from having access to people other than the interrogators?
Third, may the prisoner be held without trial? Fourth, may the prisoner
be interrogated, and, if so, how aggressively?
Common Article 3, although vague, provides some sort of response to
these questions.7 Further, the ICRC commentary provides some help.74
Beyond that, there has been very little analysis of how Common Article 3
should be applied to the practices of intelligence agencies in combating
international terrorism.
Besides the terms of Common Article 3, an important source in inter-
preting the basic obligations to international terrorists is Article 75 of
170. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International did write reports about him.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE UNITED STATES' "DISAPPEARED": THE CIA's LONG-
TERM "GHOST DETAINEES" 36-38 (2004), http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/usl004/
iraql005.pdf; Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, USA: Interrogation Techniques Amount to
Torture (May 13,2004), http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510812004.
171. See, e.g., Media Release, Attorney-Gen.'s Dep't, Australian Government, Briefing
on David Hicks (July 28, 2006), http://www.clrc.gov.au/agd/WWW/MinisterRuddock
Home.nsf/Page/MediaReleases (follow "Media Releases" hyperlink; then follow
"145/2006-28 July 2006-Briefing On David Hicks" hyperlink).
172. Josh White, Red Cross Meets with 14 Moved to Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST,
Oct. 13, 2006, at A23.
173. For the narrow purposes of this Article, I do not fully explore other provisions
from the Geneva Conventions, such as prisoner of war protections, as possible analogies.
174. See generally OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra note 67.
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Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.175 Although the
United States has not signed this protocol, many consider it part of cus-
tomary international law.'76 Article 75 states, among other things, that
the prisoners must be told the reasons they are being held, must be
"treated humanely in all circumstances," and, unless they have commit-
ted criminal offenses, must be released as soon as circumstances alow.
77
Once again, though, the standards are general; they call for humanity and
decency.
Although I boil down Common Article 3 to a requirement of humane
treatment, I recognize that a longer and more detailed analysis could ex-
plore nuances among particular terms in that one Article. For example, I
have not analyzed whether what distinguishes cruel treatment from tor-
ture is (a) the severity of the pain the prisoner feels (such that torture is
an extreme form of cruelty), or (b) the purpose to the treatment such that
cruel treatment automatically becomes torture if it is connected to inter-
rogation.178 Such nuances are not so important to my general conclusions.
A. Secret Prisons
Common Article 3 is not explicit about secret prisons. Secrecy can be a
problem under Common Article 3 to the extent it constitutes abuse of a
prisoner or increases the chances for abuse. Not everything, however,
was kept secret from CIA prisoners. They witnessed their own deten-
tions, and they must have soon realized that they were suspected of some
connection to international terrorism. They may not have known, of
course, who suspected them or the reasons for the suspicion.
It is possible that the CIA, keeping the prisoners guessing, did not tell
them where they were being held. Or the CIA, in a false flag operation,
may have misrepresented to them where they were held. KSM, for ex-
ample, may have been more anxious if he had been led to believe he was
175. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 75, June 8,
1977,1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
176. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2797 (2006) (plurality opinion) ("Al-
though the United States declined to ratify Protocol I, its objections were not to Article 75
thereof."); William H. Taft, IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Fea-
tures, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 322 (2003) ("While the United States has major objections
to parts of Additional Protocol I, it does regard the provisions of Article 75 as an articula-
tion of safeguards to which all persons in the hands of an enemy are entitled.").
177. Protocol I, supra note 175, art. 75.
178. Compare August 2002 Memo, supra note 43, at 115, 119-25 (stating that torture is
at the extreme end of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment), with Jennifer Moore, Prac-
ticing What We Preach: Humane Treatment for Detainees in the War on Terror, 34 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 33, 49 n.62, 49-50 (2006) (arguing that torture is no more severe than
inhuman treatment but differs only in that it is used for the purpose of extracting informa-
tion).
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in Egyptian hands. Or the CIA may have been straight with the prison-
ers about where they were held. Yet, under all three scenarios, the public
was not told-and has not been told-where the prisoners were held.
179
That much is secret.
There are many explanations for keeping a prisoner's location a secret.
First, secrecy may help protect the host governments from any domestic
or international backlash.180 A country may agree to house CIA prisoners
only if the United States keeps that country's cooperation in confidence.
Second, secrecy adds to security."' It is close to impossible for al Qaeda
to break KSM out of captivity if it does not know where he is held.
Third, for the maximum effectiveness of American operations, secrecy
keeps in the dark those al Qaeda members who have not been captured.
Fourth, and related to the third explanation, secrecy eliminates or re-
duces communications between the captive and the outside world.
Secret or not, so many of the standards on detention and interrogation
are relative. Those who take hostages could be called criminals, CIA
officers, or both. No matter the label, those who take hostages usually do
not advertise the locations because that would facilitate rescue of the
hostages and would defeat the hostage-takers' purpose of extracting a
182
ransom.
Often, a sense of invisibility facilitates crime. For example, a driver on
a California highway is most likely to exceed the posted speed limit if he
knows there are no patrol cars, no police airplanes, and nothing else in
the form of surveillance. Very few people follow the law strictly, and
even fewer follow the law, whether it is a speed limit or an international
standard, when there is no chance for enforcement. Although Common
Article 3 does not mention anything about secrecy or secret detention,
the activities it does mention (i.e., torture, hostage-taking, and humiliat-
ing treatment) are more likely to occur in darkness than in the light of
day.
179. See Priest & Higham, supra note 137 (providing one of the first accounts of the
existence of the CIA's secret prison program to the public).
180. See Priest, supra note 4 (disclosure of prison locations might disrupt counterter-
rorism efforts in host countries and make them possible targets of terrorist attacks).
181. Remarks on the War on Terror, supra note 11, at 1570 ("Many specifics of [the
CIA prison] program, including where these detainees have been held and the details of
their confinement, cannot be divulged. Doing so would provide our enemies with informa-
tion they could use to take retribution against our allies and harm our country.").
182. If a state has taken hostages, the stakes are different. When the Iranians took
hostages in the American embassy in Tehran, they generally acknowledged where the
hostages were being held. See John Kifner, Teheran Leader Says Riots May Have Been
Incited as Part of Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1980, § 1, at 1. They dared the American
Government to do something through diplomatic or military channels. After an aborted
rescue attempt, however, the hostages were moved to secret locations. Id.
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By necessity, many intelligence activities must be secret. A typical hu-
man source or an "asset" will not betray her country, handing over im-
portant information to the CIA, unless she is confident the CIA will pro-
tect her. If she is revealed as a spy, she will be imprisoned, tortured, or
killed in her home country. But the secrecy that is essential to gathering
foreign intelligence and conducting covert action also contains the seeds
of abuse. How do we give spymasters enough discretion to do their jobs
but not so much that they eat away at our democracy? That is the co-
nundrum. Intelligence officers, inclined to think they know best for na-
tional security, will push their activities into darker shades of gray, not
completely accountable to oversight committees, to the courts, or to a
public that has only a partial view of their activities.
When the CIA takes on the task of jailing suspected terrorists, the
problems that stem from secrecy are acute. Prisons, no matter where
they are located, always have the potential for abuse. Some interrogators
and some guards, like some drivers on California highways, will follow
the rules no matter what. But some interrogators and guards will be
tempted to abuse their power to extract sexual, financial, and other fa-
vors from the prisoners. The relationship of master to slave, whether in a
CIA facility or a federal penitentiary, cannot be defined away.
The CIA's lack of experience in handling prisoners accentuates the po-
tential for abuse. The CIA is not the Bureau of Prisons when it comes to
long-term detention. Sometimes spies who have walked into an intelli-
gence agency's control are held against their will while the agency checks
their bona fides to make sure they are "true" spies, not "dangles," "dou-
bles," or "provocations." This process of checking is part of classic es-
pionage. But after the bona fides are checked, the false spy is sent back
without instructions, or the true spy is sent back as an "agent in place."
In either scenario, false or true, the detention is short. Now, holding sus-
pected terrorists for months and years is part of a different and dangerous
era in espionage.
Another negative to secret detention is that other agencies, inside or
outside the American government, are not allowed into the facilities to
monitor CIA activities. Although the CIA may point to the possibility of
internal oversight, there is no evidence that the CIA's Office of Inspector
General or the CIA's Office of General Counsel, has inspected any of the
CIA's facilities or has interviewed any of the prisoners to determine
whether they have been tortured. If any oversight has occurred, it is in
the national interest for the CIA to disclose it.
One part of Common Article 3 provides for outside inspections of de-
tention facilities. The last subsection states that "[aln impartial humani-
tarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may
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offer its services to the Parties to the conflict."183 Yet, nothing in Com-
mon Article 3 says that a party, including the United States, must accept
the offer.88 In other places, the Geneva Conventions impose clear re-
quirements on the parties. Indeed, the preceding part of Common Arti-
cle 3 is absolute: "[T]he following acts are and shall remain prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever .... ,,185 In short, the difference
between "may" and "shall" is quite significant. As long as the CIA can
handle the prisoner's medical care, the CIA is free to choose whether or
not it wants to include the ICRC186 When the prisoners were at secret
187
sites, the CIA chose not to include any humanitarian bodies.
1Most in the human rights community are opposed to secret prisons. '
Isolation, by itself, may be inhumane. Captors, in a different context, are
not allowed to place prisoners of war in solitary confinement; a POW is
given the right to mix with other POWs.8 9 Although nothing in Common
Article 3 refers to isolation or solitary confinement, the basic spirit of
decency and humanity that pervades the article may preclude secret pris-
ons. On the other hand, other parts of the Geneva Conventions provide
for isolating a prisoner. For example, if a protected person is detained as
a "spy or saboteur," he can "be regarded as having forfeited rights of
communication."' 90 Therefore, if a terrorist is the modern equivalent of a
spy or a saboteur, isolation may not be inhumane.
183. Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 3.
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. See Jennifer R. White, Note, IEEPA's Override Authority: Potential for a Viola-
tion of the Geneva Conventions' Right to Access for Humanitarian Organizations?, 104
MICH. L. REv. 2019, 2019-21 (2006) (stating that Common Article 3 creates an obligation
for parties to the conflict to provide care, which can be delegated to impartial humanitar-
ian bodies); see also OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra note 67, at 42 ("The Parties to the
conflict may, of course, decline the offer [of the impartial humanitarian body's assistance]
if they can do without it.").
187. See Priest, supra note 4 (noting that "[n]o one outside the CIA is allowed to talk
with or even see" the approximately top thirty al Qaeda prisoners held in the CIA prison
program).
188. See Priest, supra note 3.
189. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 103 ("A prisoner of war shall not be
confined while awaiting trial unless a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power
would be so confined if he were accused of a similar offence, or if it is essential to do so in
the interests of national security."); see also OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra note 67, at
480 (stating that solitary confinement is not allowed under Article 103 for prisoners of war
awaiting trial). Article 71 further provides prisoners of war with right to send and receive
letters, cards, and telegrams. Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 71.
190. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 6, art. 5 ("Where in occupied territory an
individual protected person is detained as a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite
suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying Power, such person shall, in
those cases where absolute military security so requires, be regarded as having forfeited
rights of communication under the present Convention.").
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Such questions do not have easy answers. There is just too much un-
known space between CIA practices and Common Article 3 to make a
definitive call on secret prisons.
B. No Access to Friends, Family, or Lawyers
Preventing prisoners from having access to friends, family, or lawyers
relates to the secrecy of the prison. Some at the CIA might say that se-
crecy and denied access are the same issue, if not two sides of the same
coin. Even so, it is conceivable for the prisoners to have some access to
their friends, family, or lawyers while the CIA maintains general secrecy
about the facility. The visitor, in exchange for access to a prisoner, could
be required to sign a (largely symbolic) secrecy agreement.' The visitor
could be taken to the facility under a blindfold, and other CIA officers
could perform surveillance to ensure that the visitor abides by an agree-
ment to keep everything secret.
In other words, although secrecy does not always lead to complete iso-
lation, denied access is really just a synonym for isolation. Therefore, the
answer about secret prisons sets the floor for the answer about denied
access: such CIA practices may not comply with Common Article 3's ex-
pectation of humane treatment. Once again, the facts about CIA activi-
ties are thin, and the legal standards are vague.
At least one international tribunal has determined that isolation alone
can constitute inhumane treatment. 92 Although a few people might side
with Jean-Paul Sartre that hell is being with others, most agree that it is
painful to be cut off from friends and family. Humans do better in groups
than on their own. 93 That much we know about humanity.
C. No Trials
The question about putting off trials is the easiest. 94 Common Article 3
does not require judicial proceedings against the persons being held in
the armed conflict. If these persons are charged with violating the laws of
war, as Hamdan was, Common Article 3 sets the minimum procedures.
191. How such an agreement could be enforced, whether through courts or arbitration,
against U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens, is left open.
192. Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 1 156 (July 29,
1988).
193. Joe Tomaka et al., The Relation of Social Isolation, Loneliness, and Social Support
to Disease Outcomes Among the Elderly, 18 J. AGING & HEALTH 359, 382 (2006) ("Over-
all, the data show that favorable social conditions, such as low loneliness and high support
from family, friends, and social groups are important predictors of disease outcomes, both
in Hispanic and in Caucasian samples.").
194. This is a different question from determining, as noted above, how much process
the secret prisoners are due in contesting their designation as enemy combatants. Holding
that factor constant, I assume that the designation was lawful to allow me to study the trial
variable.
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Military trials are possible as long as they are done by "regularly consti-
tuted court[s] affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized
as indispensable by civilized peoples."'95 Nothing in Common Article 3
prevents such persons from being held for the duration of the conflict.'
96
In Hamdan, the Supreme Court came close to conceding this point: "It
bears emphasizing that Hamdan does not challenge, and we do not today
address, the Government's power to detain him for the duration of active
hostilities in order to prevent such harm."'97 The harm the Court was
referring to is the death or serious injury to innocents caught up in al
Qaeda plots.
What Justice Stevens does not make explicit in Hamdan is that the Su-
preme Court has already examined, in some detail, the issue of putting
off trials. That examination took place in the Hamdi case.' 98 Neither
Hamdi nor Common Article 3 permits civilians to be held without any
process.' 9  Under international humanitarian law, the captors in an
armed conflict are given a reasonable opportunity to separate those per-
sons who are dangerous-combatants-from those who are not-
noncombatants. 2°° As soon as the captors confirm that someone is a civil-
ian, for example, a missionary or a journalist at the wrong place at the
wrong time, they should release him or her if that is safe and reason-
able. 21 Yet, many people caught up in armed conflict are not innocent
civilians. For example, the Geneva Conventions presume that members
of armed forces who have laid down their arms will be dangerous if they
are not detained. 2°2 The same applies to the sick and the wounded from
the armed forces because, after they receive medical treatment, they
could return to battle.1 3 For these reasons, prisoners of war can be held
195. Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 3.
196. See id.
197. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2798 (2006).
198. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("It is a clearly
established principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer than active hostili-
ties."); see also Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 118 ("Prisoners of war shall be
released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.").
199. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 3; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520 (plurality
opinion).
200. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 5 ("Should any doubt arise as to
whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of
the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall
enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been
determined by a competent tribunal.").
201. See id.
202. See id. art. 3(1) (affording protections to "members of armed forces who have laid
down their arms").
203. See id.; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion) ("The purpose of detention is to
prevent captured individuals from returning to the field of battle and taking up arms once
again.").
Catholic University Law Review
for the duration of the conflict.2 4 By extension, those persons who re-
ceive the lowest protection under international humanitarian law-al
Qaeda and other international terrorists-should not expect any better
treatment from Common Article 3.
Yaser Hamdi, like Salim Hamdan, was captured during American ac-
tions against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan after 9/11.205 The
Executive branch designated Hamdi an "enemy combatant," or someone
who "was part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coa-
lition partners in Afghanistan and who engaged in an armed conflict
against the United States there.' '2°6 At the time of the Court's decision,
Hamdi was a United States citizen by virtue of his birth in Louisiana.
27
Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality, relied on Congress' Authori-
zation for Use of Military Force to rule that Hamdi could be held as an
enemy combatant. 8 She viewed Hamdi's detention, preventing him
from returning to the battlefield, as a "fundamental incident of waging
war."2 In addition, splitting the difference between civil libertarian and
executive supremacy camps, she made clear that the process for designat-
ing Hamdi as an enemy combatant had to include more than the Presi-
dent's determination, and more than the "some evidence" standard, to
pass constitutional muster.
Hamdan, who never was a United States citizen, does not deserve more
protections than Hamdi did as a United States citizen. The same logic
applies to Abu Zubaydah and KSM. Provided the process to their desig-
nations as enemy combatants has been sufficient, they may be held for
the duration of the conflict with al Qaeda. If tried and convicted by a
military commission, they may be held longer if the term of their sen-
tences exceeds the conflict.1
Although the government was not seeking the death sentence in Ham-
dan's case, a death sentence is not per se inconsistent with Common Arti-
204. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 118 ("Prisoners of war shall be
released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.").
205. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510 (plurality opinion).
206. Id. at 516 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
207. Id. at 510.
208. Id. at 517.
209. Id. at 519 ("Because detention to prevent a combatant's return to the battlefield is
a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of 'necessary and appropriate
force,' Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circum-
stances considered here.").
210. Id. at 537 ("Any process in which the Executive's factual assertions go wholly
unchallenged or are simply presumed correct without any opportunity for the alleged
combatant to demonstrate otherwise falls constitutionally short.").
211. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2798 (2006) (stating that the U.S. gov-
ernment can hold Hamdan for the duration of conflict without trying him, but in order to
subject Hamdan to criminal punishment that exceeds the duration of the conflict, the ex-
ecutive must comply with all relevant rules of law).
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cle 3. Indeed, Common Article 3 concedes in clear terms the possibility
of "carrying out of executions. ''1 12 In sum, during an armed conflict with
international terrorism, the CIA's secret prisoners do not need to face
trials. If they are tried, the process needs to be fair, and death sentences
may be part of that fair process.
D. Aggressive Interrogations
The question about interrogation tactics is the most difficult. CIA law-
yers or other administration lawyers who advise on these practices are
privy to the classified facts. Those outside the inner sanctum are left to
speculate. In this regard, we are all indebted to Dana Priest and other
excellent investigative reporters who dig up secrets for us from the CIA.
Even when Common Article 3 is condensed to a duty of humane
treatment, at least three clusters of subsidiary questions about interroga-
tions tactics still present themselves. In the first cluster, what is the rele-
vant perspective? Is it a particular prisoner's perspective? Or, is it the
perspective of a reasonable prisoner? For example, CIA interrogators
might refer to prisoners by their last names, and most prisoners may react
to this as a sign of respect. Yet, this reference, a last name without "Mr."
attached, may cause a particular prisoner to feel humiliated, a humiliation
so deep that, for several months, he cannot express it to anyone else, not
to the interrogators or the other prisoners. Would this particular reaction
result in a violation of Common Article 3? If that is not enough, even an
objective standard will be laden with ambiguity. Is the standard tied to
the average al Qaeda member? The average terrorist? Or the average
prisoner?
In answering such questions within the first cluster, international tribu-
nals have done little more than provide circular definitions. For example,
the International Criminal Court, in providing elements to the crime of
humiliation and degradation, purported to offer an objective standard:
"The severity of the humiliation, degradation or other violation was of
such degree as to be generally recognized as an outrage upon personal
dignity., 213 Generally recognized by whom? And in what context? More
specific guidance is necessary.
In the second cluster of questions, is the CIA interrogator's intent at all
relevant in determining whether a violation of Common Article 3 has
occurred? Whether in the interrogation room or elsewhere, sometimes
our actions hurt or humiliate someone despite our best intentions. In
other words, is Common Article 3 a strict liability provision in which in-
212. Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 3.
213. INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES art. 8(2)(c)(ii)(2) (2002) available at http://icc-
cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Element-ofCrimesEnglish.pdf.
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tent is irrelevant? Or is negligence the standard? Or gross negligence?
If some intent is necessary, how specific must it be? That the interroga-
tor's purpose was to violate Common Article 3? Or general awareness
that the interrogator's actions could result in something within the scope
of Common Article 3?
For example, the CIA interrogator may propose to shave a prisoner's
beard to treat an infestation of lice, but the prisoner may prefer lice over
the indignity he feels in not having a beard consistent with his cultural
and religious norms. The clash of civilizations thus affects the most basic
encounters between interrogator and prisoner; not all cultures accept the
same values or give the same weight to shared values. Even if the CIA
interrogator consults a CIA physician who agrees that the prisoner's
beard should be shaved, will the shaving constitute a violation of Com-
mon Article 3 because of the prisoner's strong protests, complete with
tears and threats to go on a hunger strike? And if the prisoner does go
on a hunger strike, will the physician's forced feeding result in another
violation? In all, there seem to be more questions than answers.
To be sure, such issues of negligence and intent create uncertainty un-
der American tort law and criminal law. These issues, however, create
even more uncertainty under the less developed jurisprudence of Com-
mon Article 3. To the CIA officers who operate under these standards,
these ambiguities are difficult to handle. In figurative terms, it is unfair
to ticket CIA officers for speeding if the posted limits can be changed, at
the whim of the police, from miles per hour to kilometers per hour.
Across differences in geography, the posted speed limits should be con-
sistent and reasonable.
In the third cluster of questions, does Common Article 3 permit any
sort of cost-benefit analysis between the harshness of the CIA's interro-
gation tactics and the expected gains from the prisoner's information?
Here, to be clear, I am not considering torture to defuse a ticking
bomb . 4 I am considering much less severe tactics such as speaking in a
loud voice to a prisoner. In the United States, tort law and criminal law
consider the costs and the benefits to actions. For civil or criminal sanc-
tions, often the line is quite thin between an American officer being
guilty of an assault on a suspect or being innocent because of reasonable
214. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE METHODS OF
INVESTIGATION OF THE GENERAL SECURITY SERVICE REGARDING HOSTILE TER-
RORIST ACTIVITY (1987), reprinted in 23 ISR. L. REV. 146, 167-76 (1989) (containing ex-
cerpts from Israel's 1987 Landau Commission, which discussed the "ticking time bomb"
scenario); see also ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING
THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 131-65 (2002) (examining the "ticking
time bomb" scenario in the war on terror).
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self-defense. 15 When considering a totality of circumstances, so much
216depends on the apparent risks to the officer and the dangers of inaction.
Quite simply, does it make sense to give a CIA interrogator more leeway
under Common Article 3 during the interrogation of KSM than in the
interrogation of a lower-level member of al Qaeda?
While I do not claim to have answers to all these questions, I have not
descended into nihilism in my analysis of Common Article 3. By raising
so many questions, I suggest that any analysis against the existing stan-
dards must be modest, humble, and tentative. I suggest that much of
what has been said and written about the interrogation of suspected ter-
rorists, no matter the legal standards, has been political posturing at the
extremes. One side is too righteous, insisting that all the old rules must
apply to the new conflict with international terrorism. The other side,
just as bad, goes too easily toward the most aggressive tactics in all situa-
tions.
Despite the exaggerations, some clear boundaries exist. In some areas,
Common Article 3 is specific about what may not be done to prisoners.
Mutilation, for example, is prohibited.217 Therefore, some practices are
obviously illegal. Cutting off a prisoner's finger to extract information is
mutilation and torture. At the other extreme, providing a stack of Na-
tional Geographic magazines is an act of kindness. Between the extremes
are many possibilities and many ambiguities. Providing Penthouse maga-
zines to a devout Muslim, for example, may not be so kind. And Playboy
may be somewhere else on the continuum of kindness. To narrow down
the possibilities, I have tried to focus on sleep deprivation, bombarding
the prisoner with loud music, and keeping the temperature uncomforta-
bly hot or cold in the prisoner's cell.218
The precedents on what constitutes cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment, or what constitutes a violation of Common Article 3, are slim.
For example, in 1978, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
assessed tactics the British government used in battling terrorism in
Northern Ireland. These tactics included forcing suspects to stand on
their toes, using hoods and loud music on the suspects, and depriving
215. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (recognizing the "'hazy border
between excessive and acceptable force"' (quoting Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919,
926-27 (11th Cir. 2000))).
216. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (noting that the determina-
tion of reasonableness of force "requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of
each particular case, including ... whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of officers and others").
217. Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 3.
218. These are among techniques commonly reported to have been used. See Brian
Ross & Richard Esposito, CIA's Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described, ABC NEWS,
Nov. 18, 2005, http://www.abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=1322866.
219. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 9-10, 40-58 (1978).
Catholic University Law Review
them of food, water, and sleep. °20 While the court did not rule the tactics
to be torture, it did rule that the combination of tactics was cruel, inhu-
man, and degrading treatment. 22' It is possible that one of these tactics,
by itself, might not have been enough to constitute CID for the ECHR.
22They were bundled in the ECHR's analysis. Even so, they create a
presumption against such tactics being ordinary and acceptable.
Later cases from the ECHR and from other tribunals are not much
more helpful. The ECHR defined degrading treatment of prisoners as
"'feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and de-
basing them and possibly breaking their physical and moral resis-
tance. ' ''221 Moreover, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
defined degrading and humiliating treatment as "[s]ubjecting victims to
treatment designed to subvert their self-regard." 4 Such definitions from
court cases do not surpass what is available in standard dictionaries. The
Oxford Dictionary defines "degrading" as "causing a loss of self-respect;
humiliating. ' '221 "Humiliation" is defined as to "make (someone) feel
ashamed and foolish by injuring their dignity and self respect, esp. pub-
licly. ''226 And "inhumane" is defined as "without compassion for misery
or suffering; cruel.
'227
Given the elasticity of Common Article 3's terms, both sleep depriva-
tion and playing loud music may be precluded. They are arguably out-
rages on personal dignity or humiliations or degradations. Each of these
two tactics, if taken to extremes, could cross into torture. Weeks of sleep
deprivation would cause the CIA prisoners to suffer, and playing the mu-
sic too loud could cause permanent damage to their hearing. Whether
the temperature to the prisoner's cell or the interrogation room violates
Common Article 3 is as delicate as the thermostats to the rooms. Ad-
justments of a few degrees hotter or colder are fine, but extremes,
whether hotter or colder, could constitute a violation. These are close
calls under Common Article 3. For this reason, President Bush was justi-
fied to complain about the vagueness of this international standard.
220. Id. at 41.
221. Id. at 66-67.
222. Id.
223. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 39 (1989) (quoting Ire-
land, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 66).
224. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, 285
(Jan. 27, 2000).
225. OXFORD AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 360 (2002).
226. Id. at 654 (drawing on the definition of "humiliate").
227. Id. at 687.
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E. President Bush's Reaction to Common Article 3
The Hamdan decision must have been a blow to President Bush. The
Supreme Court, in a disdainful mood, did not share his view of the world
since 9/11. The legality of sleep deprivation and playing loud music, not
to mention harsher tactics, was called into question under a resurrection
of Common Article 3. Perhaps lawyers from the CIA, the Justice De-
partment, and the White House made this clear in confidential communi-
cations they shared with the President after the Hamdan decision. Their
analysis, if any, of the continuing legality of the CIA program must have
been filled with the hedges and caveats that annoy black-and-white
thinkers.
Striking back at the Supreme Court, President Bush appealed to the
public and to Congress on September 6, 2006, for "clarity" on what tactics
the CIA and other interrogators could use on suspected terrorists. 228 The
President pleaded: "I'm asking that Congress make explicit that by fol-
lowing standards of the Detainee Treatment Act, our personnel are ful-
filling America's obligations under Common Article Three of the Geneva
Conventions."' 9 Unstated was an additional advantage of linking the
standard to the DTA: the DTA's primary reference is to the U.S. Consti-
tution, whereas Hamdan allows more room for international law and
foreign decisions to affect an American court's assessment of Common
Article 3. Later, in an echo, Director of Central Intelligence Michael
Hayden stated that the CIA could not continue its detention and interro-
gation program unless something was done about Hamdan.m That was a
strong step back toward the categorical.
Further, the clarity the President sought included, by way of a proposed
bill, an amendment to the War Crimes Act so that only serious violations
of Common Article 3-rather than all violations -would serve as predi-
cate acts.23' Explaining the reason for this amendment, the President
said, "I'm asking Congress to list the specific, recognizable offenses that
would be considered crimes under the War Crimes Act so our personnel
can know clearly what is prohibited in the handling of terrorist ene-
mies.",1
2
All in all, President Bush, on September 6, 2006, offered many more
clues to what was going on at the CIA after Hamdan than I did in my
conversation with Dana Priest on July 11, 2006. Hamdan had gone far
beyond stating the allowable procedures for trying a chauffeur before a
228. See Remarks on the War on Terror, supra note 11, at 1575.
229. Id.
230. See Charles Babington & Jonathan Weisman, Senators Defy Bush on Terror
Measure, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2006, at Al.
231. H.R. 6166, 109th Cong. § 6(b)(1) (2006).
232. Remarks on the War on Terror, supra note 11, at 1575.
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military commission. Hamdan was a major challenge to the legality of
the harsh techniques the CIA had reportedly used on KSM and company.
After Hamdan, the President and the CIA must have doubted that the
secret detention and interrogation program could be run with the harsh-
ness- and the level of comfort for American officers-they believed was
necessary to disrupt terrorist plots and to save innocent lives. In sum,
Hamdan was worse for the CIA than the McCain Amendment, creating
trouble for the past and the future.
V. RETROACTIVE EFFECTS
The Supreme Court, in Hamdan, brushed aside what the Bush admini-
stration considered a strong argument based on the President's inherent
powers. After the Hamdan decision, the administration's lawyers did not
make any public attempt to limit Hamdan's reach through stingy inter-
pretations; instead, accepting the rebuke, they took Hamdan at face value
for the time being. But, as time would tell, neither the President nor the
CIA was permanently resigned to Common Article 3 haunting their past
and their future.
A. The Reasons for Fear
Those who were most worried about Common Article 3 were probably
in the National Clandestine Service or the Directorate of Operations
(DO) at the CIA. The officers who conducted the interrogations on the
secret prisoners were most likely from that Directorate or contracted by
that Directorate. For several years after 9/11, DO management and offi-
cers, including the Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Direc-
tor, may have been lulled into a false sense of security about their legal
exposure. They had received secret guidance from CIA lawyers and Jus-
tice Department lawyers2 33 Hamdan, so they learned, caused Common
Article 3 to boomerang back on them.
After the Hamdan decision, senior officials at the CIA may have re-
turned to their lawyers in great distress to discuss the CIA's exposure.
Dana Priest had detected something, and other parts of the media picked
up on the CIA's concern, noting interest by CIA officers in obtaining
insurance from private companies.23 This insurance may pay for legal
expenses connected to Inspector General investigations, congressional
hearings, administrative actions, and criminal investigations. However,
this insurance cannot immunize officers from criminal exposure.
233. See George Washington University National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.
edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2007) (listing numerous declas-
sified memoranda from the Justice Department regarding interrogation policies).
234. R. Jeffery Smith, Worried CIA Officers Buy Legal Insurance, WASH. POST, Sept.
11, 2006, at Al.
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Dana Priest knew before many others that the CIA was concerned
about Common Article 3. With Hamdan in effect, CIA officers must
have seen the possibility that they could be charged with "war crimes"
under a federal statute if their treatment of secret prisoners violated in-
ternational law. A war crime, of course, is much more serious than a
charge of assault (or battery) under special maritime and territorial juris-
diction.25 At the time Hamdan was decided, a war crime was defined in
several ways. Under one subsection, it was a "grave breach" of any of the
Geneva Conventions and their protocols. 36 Under another subsection, it
was conduct identified in certain articles of the Fourth Hague Conven-
tion. 237 Elsewhere, it was a violation of the international protocols against
the use of landmines and booby traps that resulted in death of, or serious
injury to, civilians. 8 Of most concern to the CIA had to be the sub-
section that defined a war crime-without any further limitation-as a
violation of Common Article 3.239
As of July 11, 2006, deciding what constituted a war crime may have
seemed less ambiguous than deciding what constituted "torture" under
other criminal statutes.2° The ambiguity under the War Crimes Act was
one level removed: any violation of Common Article 3 was clearly men-
tioned, but, deciding what constituted "humane treatment" involved the
same interpretative problems as distinguishing cruel, inhuman, and de-
grading treatment from torture. The words were general, the factual
variations endless.
If the summer framework for the law had stayed in place, an aggressive
prosecutor might have been tempted to look back in anger on CIA activi-
ties and press criminal charges. A war crime could have been charged for
each separate interrogation tactic that went beyond Common Article 3,
and a conspiracy charge could have drawn in the people who ordered the
interrogations.
235. David Passaro, a CIA contractor, was convicted of such charges in federal court in
Raleigh, North Carolina, under 18 U.S.C. § 7(9)(A) special maritime and territorial juris-
diction. See Andrea Weigl, Passaro Convicted of Assaulting Afghan, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 18, 2006, at 1A, available at 2006 WLNR 14316102. While in Af-
ghanistan, Passaro allegedly struck a prisoner with a flashlight and punched and kicked
him. United States v. Passaro, No. 5:04-CR-211-1 (E.D.N.C. June 17, 2004), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/torture/uspassaro6l704ind.html (containing the in-
dictment of Passaro). This abuse resulted in the prisoner's death. Id.
236. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(1) (2000).
237. Id. § 2441(c)(2).
238. Id. § 2441(c)(4).
239. Id. § 2441(c)(3), amended by Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
366, § 6(b)(1), 120 Stat. 2600, 2633.
240. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd (West Supp. 2007) (defining cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment).
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B. The Reasons for Comfort
During the hot summer after Hamdan, the lawyers at the CIA may
have told the CIA officers not to worry.241 Despite reports, before Ham-
dan, that the CIA's Office of Inspector General had made referrals to the
Justice Department for criminal investigations into some CIA interroga-
tions,2 2 the lawyers may have promised that everything would be fine.
Very few people, if anyone at all, have been prosecuted in American
courts for war crimes. If charged, the CIA officers could claim that the
criminal statute was void for vagueness. Or they could say they did not
have criminal intent. Their defense could be that they were acting under
the advice of counsel. For this defense to work, they would have to show
that it was reasonable to rely on that advice.243 To bolster themselves, as
Defense Exhibit #1, they could refer to the Office of Legal Counsel
memorandum, which had stated that Common Article 3 did not apply to
al Qaeda.2"
The lawyers might have identified other factors in the CIA's favor.
The prosecutors, beyond dealing with potential defenses, might have
problems of proof concerning the CIA interrogations. In a highly secre-
tive program, the witnesses are few. And there is no evidence from the
public record that the interrogations were videotaped or photographed.
Because suspected terrorists are not appealing victims, the prosecutors
would also have to deal with the possibility that the jury would nullify
verdicts that were otherwise supported by the evidence.
Even if prosecutors can gather the evidence, and even if they can avoid
jury nullification, their cases might be complicated or eventually aban-
doned because they would tread on matters of national security. The
executive branch, after all, has the prerogative to decide what is classified
and what stays classified. The Classified Information Procedures Act
(CIPA)4' does not resolve the so-called "disclose or dismiss" dilemma to
prosecutions that are connected to classified information. Rather than
have these activities revealed to the public, the Director of Central Intel-
ligence (DCI) and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) might
241. A most ethical CIA lawyer, recognizing that her loyalty extended to the CIA as
an entity rather than to individual officers may not have said anything or, at most, might
have recommended that the CIA officers obtain private counsel.
242. Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, Within C.I.A., Growing Fears of Prosecution,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, § 1, at 1 (describing the CIA's internal review of interrogations
of terrorism suspects, which one official called the Agency's "robust effort ... to ensure
that its conduct had been proper," and noting that some of the reviewed cases have been
referred to the Justice Department).
243. In a different context, for example, a bank robber could not successfully defend
himself by saying that a lawyer advised him that he could use a machine gun to demand
money from the teller.
244. See January 2002 Memo, supra note 38.
245. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (Supp. IV 2004).
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convince the Attorney General to drop any prosecution. In so doing,
their arguments might focus on protecting intelligence sources and meth-
ods rather than admitting in candor that they were covering up for errant
CIA officers. In whatever way the DCI and the DNI frame their argu-
ments, the result would be the same: no prosecution of CIA officers.
Prosecutors have the discretion not to indict even when the proof is
there and even when CIPA complications can be resolved through sum-
maries and substitutions of classified evidence. The Justice Department
reports to the President, the statute for an independent counsel is gone,
and the White House might resist pressures for a special counsel. To be
sure, under the Bush administration, a federal prosecutor would not go
far-in the case or in her career-with a war crimes prosecution. The
prosecutors in the Eastern District of Virginia, where CIA headquarters
are located, have not been in a rush to bring charges against a popular
CIA. As a cautionary tale, they might look to another terrorism prosecu-
tor, Patrick Fitzgerald, to remind themselves of how politics can sully the
best of reputations.' 6
CIA officers, even reassured by CIA lawyers, may have continued to
worry about Common Article 3 to the extent they realized that war
247
crimes do not have a statute of limitations. A Democrat or a true Re-
publican maverick, they may have said, could be elected President. A
resilient CIA lawyer, however, might have countered that it is unlikely
that a new Justice Department would dig into interrogation practices that
took place after 9/11. Such digging, by Democrats or Republicans in ei-
ther branch, would set them up for the charge of being weak in combat-
ing terror. That charge, in the politics after 9/11, seems far more damag-
ing than any interrogations that went beyond Common Article 3.
Despite the pleas of some human rights organizations, very few people
were clamoring for an investigation into what the CIA did to KSM, Abu
Zubaydah, or Ramsi bin al-Shibh. The sad truth is that before President
Bush announced their transfer to Guantanamo, the high-level prisoners
garnered little interest from the rest of the public.
C. The Political Fix
Even without the support of lawyers, the CIA's officers did not need to
fret too much about Common Article 3. They know that at the CIA the
246. Fitzgerald was a high-profile prosecutor in the Southern District of New York.
See Peter Slevin, The Prosecutor Never Rests, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2005, at C1. One of his
cases related to al Qaeda's bombings of the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanza-
nia. Id. Later, as United States attorney in the Northern District of Illinois, Fitzgerald
investigated the "outing" of CIA officer, Valerie Plame. Id. His investigation resulted in
the indictment of "Scooter" Libby, Vice President Cheney's former chief of staff, and a
host of negative comments. Id.
247. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West Supp. 2007).
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dice are often loaded in their favor. CIA officers are protected, as they
should be, when they follow the law. And even if they break the law,
they may be protected by the cloak of secrecy, the cover of darkness, and
the benefit of legislative favors. The CIA has strong support at the White
House, allies who do not allow too bright a light to shine on intelligence
activities, friends who can deal with troublesome decisions from the Na-
tion's highest court, and operators who know how to make things happen
on Capitol Hill. Out in the open, the Director of Central Intelligence,
Michael Hayden, lobbied for changes to the law.2'4 Various representa-
tives and senators agreed with President Bush that changes in the law
were necessary to permit the CIA's secret detention and interrogation
program to continue.249 Waving the American flag, they all played up the
CIA's importance to national security.
Thus, more than five years after 9/11, the President and a Republican-
controlled Congress finally started to sort out some of the details of the
interrogations of terrorism suspects and of the military commissions used
to try these suspects. After a series of back-room meetings between
Bush's National Security Adviser, Stephen Hadley, and Senators Lindsey
Graham, John McCain, and John Warner, all Republicans, the President
and Congress settled on a compromise.20 With the Democrats on the
sidelines, the President got most of what he wanted concerning terrorism
suspects and military commissions. On October 17, 2006, with some of
the CIA's allies, friends, and operators looking on, President Bush signed
the Military Commissions Act of 2006 into law.25 It was a victory for the
Republicans, about a month before their losses in the mid-term elections.
In tandem with the President, the CIA officers got what they wanted
overall-if not more. The MCA took care of problems that stemmed
from Hamdan and gave the CIA protections that went beyond those of
the McCain Amendment.
In this story, the CIA converted a judicial setback into a legislative tri-
umph. First, the War Crimes Act was amended and limited to a list of
"grave breaches" of Common Article 3.52 Second, this amendment of the
War Crimes Act was made retroactive to 1997 .5 Third, except for grave
breaches, the Act authorizes the President to issue "authoritative" regu-
248.. Babington & Weisman, supra note 230 (quoting a CIA spokesman as saying Hay-
den "'wants to protect the people who work for him' and who take risks to 'help keep all
Americans safe"').
249. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REc. S10,362-63 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Bond).
250. Kate Zernike, Top Republicans Reach an Accord on Detainee Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22,2006, at Al.
251. Remarks on Signing the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 42 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1831 (Oct. 17, 2006).
252. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441(c)(3), (d) (West Supp. 2007).
253. Id. § 2441 note (Effective and Applicability Provisions).
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lations on the scope of Common Article 3.5 Parts or all of this guidance
on permitted tactics in CIA interrogations may be classified and hidden
from the public. 52 Fourth, American courts are precluded from using
foreign or international law to interpret the list of grave breaches of
Common Article 3 that serve as definitions in the War Crimes Act.21'
Fifth, instead of having the option of paying for legal fees for CIA offi-
cers, as provided in the McCain Amendment, the government is now
required to pay such fees.57 This requirement goes beyond a "prosecu-
tion," and is extended to even an "investigation." 8 In all, the CIA had to
be pleased, since the MCA prevented Common Article 3 from crashing
into the CIA the way some officers had feared.
For some, the story has a happy ending. The CIA personnel who were
involved in the aggressive interrogations of KSM and company are cross-
ing their fingers that the MCA will hold. With the MCA, CIA personnel
are safer from criminal suits and freer from the restrictions of Common
Article 3 than they were on July 11, 2006. The anxiety that was height-
ened by a Supreme Court decision in the summer was alleviated by an act
of the elected branches in the fall. As the leaves started to change
around the Nation's capital, Dana Priest moved on to other stories and
the CIA returned to the shadows.
254. Id. § 2441 note (Implementation of Treaty Obligations).
255. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd-0(3) (West Supp. 2007) (not requiring the publication of
the President's regulations).
256. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 note (Implementation of Treaty Obligations).
257. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd-1(b).
258. Id.
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